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Abstract: We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’
access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the
market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public
information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to
grant unproﬁtable loans in order to transfer them to other parties, leading to an increase
in aggregate risk. Nevertheless, the introduction of CRT generally increases welfare in
our setup. However, under private information, higher competition induces an expansion
of loans to unproﬁtable ﬁrms, which in the limit oﬀsets the welfare gains from CRT
completely.
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In the years before the subprime crisis, many countries have seen an explosion in the use
of instruments for credit risk transfer (CRT) by ﬁnancial institutions. At that time, this
development was welcomed by many observers. Most prominently, it was argued that
CRT leads to a desirable redistribution and better diversiﬁcation of credit risks (see, e.g.,
Allen and Gale, 2005). Another advantage is the potential of CRT to improve the access
to credit for ﬁrms and households (or, put diﬀerently, the ability of banks to free up
capital; see, e.g., Chiesa, 2008).1 However, the advent of the subprime crisis has raised
doubts about the overall beneﬁts of credit risk transfer. The recent experience suggests
that CRT may also lead to a deterioration of loan quality, with detrimental consequences
for ﬁnancial stability.
From a theoretical perspective, this decline in loan quality did not come unexpectedly.
The early literature on credit risk transfer emphasized the reduced monitoring incentives
of banks, once a loan has been transferred to a third party (see, e.g., Pennacchi, 1988;
Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995).2 However, recent empirical ﬁndings also suggest that there
has been an expansion of low quality loans.3 Many of the loans granted during the credit
boom preceding the subprime crisis were of such a bad quality that banks must have been
aware of the poor loan quality when the loan was granted (an extreme example are the
notorious “ninja” loans). It seems that banks granted low quality loans and transferred
them to other parties afterwards.4
In addition, the decrease in lending standards on the eve of the subprime crisis has
been shown to be related to the market structure in the banking sector. Dell’Ariccia,
1For an excellent survey on credit risk transfer, see Duﬃe (2007).
2Other papers dealing with the eﬀects of CRT on monitoring incentives include Morrison (2005),
Chiesa (2008), Parlour and Plantin (2008), and Cerasi and Rochet (2008). See Ashcraft and Santos
(2008) for empirical evidence.
3Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008) document a decline in loan denial rates, which they interpret
as a decrease in lending standards.
4This view is supported by the ﬁnding of Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008) that the decline in
loan denial rates was more pronounced in regions with higher securitization rates. Moreover, Keys,
Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009a) show that loans eligible for securitization on average defaulted much
more frequently than loans with similar observable risk characteristics that were not eligible for CRT.
They interpret their ﬁnding as evidence for laxer screening of loans that were to be securitized.
1Igan, and Laeven (2008) show that loan denial rates in the subprime segment decreased
more in areas with highly competitive banking markets and that the market entry of new
ﬁnancial institutions induced a further decrease in lending standards. The role of banking
competition in the presence of credit risk transfer has to our knowledge not yet been dealt
with in the theoretical literature.
Our paper models banks’ moral hazard problem in the origination of loans and shows
how it is aﬀected by the degree of competition in the banking sector. We start from a
banking model with imperfect competition, in which the access of risky, but proﬁtable
borrowers to bank credit is constrained due to banks’ limited risk-bearing capacities.
Such constraints may arise from regulatory constraints, bankruptcy costs, or bankers’
risk aversion. We show that the credit constraints are especially tight if banking markets
are highly competitive. The reason is that the rents from relatively safe loans, which can
serve as a buﬀer for riskier activities, will be small in the presence of ﬁerce competition.
We then show that such credit constraints may be relaxed by allowing banks to transfer
risks to outside investors. However, the functioning of CRT markets depends crucially on
the type of information on which bank loans are based. If loans are granted on the basis
of publicly observable information, a transfer of credit risk works smoothly and the access
to credit for risky, but proﬁtable borrowers is improved. Since the information is public,
there is no moral hazard problem at the originating bank. The bank does not have an
incentive to grant unproﬁtable loans because nobody will be willing to insure the risks
from such loans. Hence, CRT is desirable from a welfare perspective.
If, however, loans are granted on the basis of privately observable information, the transfer
of credit risk is hampered by problems of asymmetric information. If credit insurers
cannot observe a loan’s quality, banks have an incentive to grant unproﬁtable loans and
to transfer the risks from these loans to the insurers. This is anticipated by the credit
insurers who will demand a lemons premium for credit risk transfer. CRT generally still
improves the access to ﬁnance for risky, but proﬁtable borrowers, but it also improves the
access to ﬁnance for unproﬁtable borrowers. As a result, the aggregate risk in the economy
increases. Note that, in our model, the overall welfare eﬀect of CRT is positive even with
private information. The reason is that the positive welfare eﬀects from a better access to
ﬁnance for proﬁtable borrowers overcompensate the welfare losses from ﬁnancing projects
with negative net present values (NPV).5
5The paper by Parlour and Plantin (2008) yields similar ﬁndings regarding the incentive eﬀects of
2We show further that competition generally reinforces the positive eﬀects of credit risk
transfer. The higher competition in the banking sector, the better is the access to credit.
However, with private information, an increase in competition may reduce welfare when
the loan market for proﬁtable loans is saturated. Then, a further increase in competition
only improves the access to credit for unproﬁtable borrowers. In the limit, this completely
oﬀsets the welfare gains from credit risk transfer. This ﬁnding coincides nicely with the
observations from the current crisis. During the late years of the credit boom preceding
the crisis, most of the newly extended loans seem to have been of relatively poor quality;
at the same time, these years saw an increase in competition through the market entry of
new ﬁnancial institutions (see Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven, 2008).
Finally, we show that the CRT market breaks down if competition is very low. The reason
is that low competition goes along with large risk-bearing capacities, which implies that
banks keep most proﬁtable loans on their own balance sheets, such that the average quality
of loans to be insured is low and insurers are no longer willing to insure such loans. This
may explain why CRT markets developed in an environment of banking deregulation and
increasing competition.
To sum up, our paper illustrates two important points. First, it describes how CRT may
lead to a moral hazard problem in the origination of loans. When information is private,
CRT induces banks to knowingly extend negative NPV loans, leading to an increase in
aggregate risk as seen in the recent crisis. Second, and more importantly, it shows that
the welfare consequences of CRT depend on the degree of competition in the banking
sector and on the type of information on which loans are based. The introduction of CRT
markets generally leads to an increase in welfare because it improves the access to ﬁnance
for proﬁtable borrowers. However, under private information, higher competition leads
to an expansion of negative NPV loans, which in the limit oﬀsets the welfare gains from
CRT completely.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model setup. Section 3
describes the equilibrium of the model in the absence of credit risk transfer. Section 4
analyzes the functioning of CRT markets when loans are granted on the basis of public
and private information, respectively. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
CRT, although it deals with monitoring rather than screening. Interestingly, their results on welfare are
contrary to ours. We will discuss the reasons behind this diﬀerence at the end of the paper.
32 Model Setup
Our model has several important ingredients. First, borrowers are heterogenous; they dif-
fer in their creditworthiness. Second, competition among banks is imperfect; speciﬁcally,
we use a model of Salop competition. Third, banks have limited risk-bearing capacities,
for example due to regulation. These features allow us to model lemons problems in CRT
markets and the impact of competition on banks’ risk-bearing capacities and hence on
the potential of CRT to improve borrowers’ access to credit. Later, we will distinguish
between loans based on public or private information. This will be important in the
discussion of CRT markets because the type of information will substantially aﬀect the
functioning of these markets.
Entrepreneurs. Consider an economy with a continuum of entrepreneurs. Each en-
trepreneur has access to a project that requires an investment of one unit of money. In
order to ﬁnance their projects, entrepreneurs must take up a bank loan. Projects have
one of three qualities, they are either good (G), medium (M), or bad (B).6 Entrepreneurs
with good (medium, bad) projects are called good (medium, bad) entrepreneurs. Projects
have a positive return of Y with probability pi, i ∈ {G,M,B}; otherwise they fail and re-
turn nothing. Projects of the same type are perfectly correlated. A share qG of all projects
is good. Good projects succeed with probability pG = 1. They have a positive net present
value, pG Y − r = Y − r > 0, where r is the opportunity cost of one unit of money. A
share qM of all projects is medium. Medium projects succeed with probability pM < 1,
but they also have a positive net present value, pM Y − r > 0. A share qB = 1 − qG −qM
of all projects is bad. Bad projects succeed with probability pB < pM < 1, and their net
present value is negative, pB Y − r < 0. As a result, there are two kinds of projects that
are desirable from a social perspective: the good projects, which are safe, and the medium
project, which are risky. The third class of projects is so risky that they are undesirable
from a social perspective.
6These entrepreneurs can also be interpreted as borrowing households with diﬀerent risk proﬁles.
4Figure 1: Structure of the Market for Loans
Bank 1
Bank 2 Bank n
Bad loans, share qB
Medium loans, share qM
Good loans, share qG
The ﬁgure shows a Salop circle with n = 7 banks that are distributed equidistantly on the Salop circle.
The three types of entrepreneurs, continuously located on the Salop circle, all have equal shares, qG =
qM = qB = 1/3. Dark gray stands for good entrepreneurs, medium gray for medium ones, and light gray
for bad ones.
Banking Market Structure. Banks compete for loans ` a la Salop (1979).7 They
announce loan rates RG, RM, and RB for entrepreneurs with good, medium, and bad
projects.8 The entrepreneurs are uniformly distributed on a circle of length L, which
is normalized to 1 (see Figure 1). Hence, the aggregate volume of potential projects is
L = 1, and qi L = qi is the aggregate volume of potential projects of type i. In order to
obtain a loan, an entrepreneur must travel to the bank, incurring transportation costs t
per unit of distance.9 When choosing a bank, the entrepreneurs take into account both
transportation costs and interest rates. The banks are distributed equidistantly on the
Salop circle. There is no equity; the only source of reﬁnancing is deposits, which are
oﬀered at a gross interest rate r, including the repayment of the principal. Deposits are
fully insured, and the costs of deposit insurance are normalized to zero. If a bank’s liabil-
ities exceed the returns from its loans, it defaults. We assume that the number of banks,
n, is ﬁxed. Below, we will consider free entry in the banking sector.
7The Salop model has frequently been used to model loan market competition in the banking sector.
See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for an overview. Alternative models of price competition, e.g. monopolistic
competition as in Monti (1972), Klein (1973), and Shubik and Levitan (1980), yield similar results.
8The Salop model assumes that banks do not price discriminate among entrepreneurs at diﬀerent
locations. In Section 5, we discuss a model with observable locations.
9See Degryse and Ongena (2005) for empirical evidence that transportation costs are important in
loan markets.
5Figure 2: Timing
• t = 0: Banks announce loan rates, depending on the borrowers’
qualities
• Borrowers choose a bank and invest
• Banks enter the market for credit risk transfer (if applicable)
• t = 1: Borrowers repay their loans if they are successful, otherwise
they fail. If a loan to a failing borrower has been insured, the credit
insurer repays the loan. Banks repay deposits if they can, otherwise
they fail.
Screening Technology. Banks have access to a screening technology to ﬁnd out the
quality of an entrepreneur’s project. The technology produces a noiseless signal. Later
in the paper, we will distinguish between two kinds of screening technologies, based on
either public or private information.
Banks’ Probability of Default. Finally, we assume that banks are regulated to have
a probability of default below some level α.10 As we will see later, this assumption
constrains the banks’ risk-bearing capacities and hence ﬁrms’ access to credit, yielding a
rationale for credit risk transfer.11
The time structure of the game is given in Figure 2.
3 No Credit Risk Transfer
We will now show that the described setup with no possibility of transferring risks to
other parties leads to a situation where banks are constrained in their lending due to
their restricted risk-bearing capacities. In particular, loans to medium entrepreneurs will
10This could be achieved by imposing capital requirements on the basis of a bank’s value at risk at a
conﬁdence level 1 − α.
11Pennacchi (1988) was the ﬁrst to motivate credit transfer by regulation. Alternatively, the desire for
CRT could arise from bankruptcy costs (as in Wagner and Marsh, 2006) or from bankers’ risk aversion
(as in Morrison, 2005).
6be below their optimal level. Interestingly, ﬁercer competition (through bank entry) is
shown to tighten banks’ lending constraints.
Access to credit. The loan volume granted by a single bank to borrowers of type i
is denoted by li; the aggregate volume of loans of type i is denoted by Li = nli. Bad
projects have a negative net present value, hence bad entrepreneurs do not have access
to loans in equilibrium, i.e. lB = 0. A bank’s probability of default is determined by its
loan volumes and loan rates. With probability pM, both good and medium loans repay,
and the bank’s proﬁt is (RG −r)lG+(RM −r)lM > 0. With probability 1−pM, only the
good loans repay, and the proﬁt is (RG − r)lG − r lM. If this term is (weakly) positive,
then the bank’s probability of default is zero. If this term is negative, then the bank’s
default probability is 1 − pM. For the solvency regulation to be eﬀective, the required
maximum default probability α has to be smaller than 1 − pM, implying that
(RG − r)lG − rlM ≥ 0. (1)
In the following, we assume that the regulation has an eﬀect, such that condition (1)
binds in equilibrium. We restrict our attention to situations where the good loan market
is covered completely, such that banks compete for loans at least in this loan segment.
This will always be true when banking markets are suﬃciently competitive (e.g., n is
suﬃciently large or t is suﬃciently small). We can then calculate lG by deriving the
distance xG between a bank and a good borrower who is just indiﬀerent between a loan
from the bank at a loan rate RG and a loan from the neighboring bank at a loan rate R′
G,
(Y − RG) − txG = (Y − R
′
G) − t(1/n − xG). (2)











Condition (1) implies that banks cannot grant as many medium loans as they would like to
in the absence of regulation; the access to credit is constrained for medium entrepreneurs
due to limited risk-bearing capacities of banks. Hence, the market for medium loans is not
covered and banks enjoy local monopolies in the segment for medium loans, as depicted
in Figure 3.






lG = 2 qG xG
lM = 2qM xM
The ﬁgure shows a typical market share of a bank. Note that the good loan segment is covered completely,
but not the medium loan segment. Banks do not grant any bad loans.
We can then calculate the distance of a medium borrower (xM) who is just indiﬀerent
between a loan from a bank at a loan rate RM and no loan at all,
pM (Y − RM) − txM = 0. (4)
Solving for xM and considering that lM = 2qM xM, we get




Banks maximize their expected proﬁts,
Π = (RG − r)lG + (pM RM − r)lM, (6)
subject to condition (1). This maximization yields RG, RM and λ, the shadow price of
condition (1). Proposition 1a characterizes the described equilibrium.12
Proposition 1a (Equilibrium without CRT) There is an equilibrium in which the
market for good loans is covered completely, the market for medium loans is not covered
completely, and the shadow price λ of condition (1) is strictly positive. This equilibrium
obtains if
• qM/qG > (Y − r)/(2r),
12The proofs of all propositions can be found in the Appendix.
8• n ≥ t/(Y − r), and




qM r(pM Y − r).
The ﬁrst two conditions guarantee that the good market is covered, but not the medium
market. The third condition implies that the shadow price λ is strictly positive.
Some socially beneﬁcial, but risky projects (of type M) are not carried out because banks
have to avoid default to satisfy regulatory constraints. We will see later that this restric-
tion can be eased by introducing a market for credit risk transfer (Section 4).
Competition. According to condition (1), a bank’s risk-bearing capacity is determined
by its proﬁts from the good loan segment. These depend on the intensity of competition
in the banking sector. This leads to the interesting result that the access to credit for
medium ﬁrms is reduced by ﬁercer competition. Proposition 1b summarizes the eﬀects of
competition on ﬁrms’ access to credit.
Proposition 1b (Competition) Higher competition (higher n)
• leaves the aggregate amount of good loans unaﬀected, dLG/dn = 0,
• lowers the aggregate amount of medium loans, dLM/dn < 0,
• increases the shadow price of condition (1), dλ/dn > 0.
Surprisingly, more banks lead to a lower market penetration for medium loans (see the
second chart of Figure 4, which is based on a numerical example). The reason is the
following. When competition intensiﬁes, the banks’ margins in the good loan segment
shrink due to decreasing loan rates for good loans, RG (see the ﬁrst chart of Figure 4).
These margins determine how aggressive banks are in the medium loan segment because
banks have to comply with condition (1). The lower the proﬁts in the good loan segment,
the lower are the banks’ buﬀers against default, and the fewer medium loans they are
willing to grant. Hence, loan rates RM increase, and the market penetration in the
medium loan segment declines. In other words, the underprovision of loans in the medium
segment (i.e. proﬁtable, but risky loans) is most severe when there is ﬁerce competition








































Colors are the same as in Figure 1: Light gray stands for bad borrowers, medium gray for medium
borrowers, and dark gray for good borrowers. Parameters for the numerical example are qG = qM =
qB = 1/3, pG = 1, pM = 2/3, pB = 1/3, Y = 2, r = 1, and t = 2. The larger the number of banks, the
higher the competition for good borrowers, which shows up in a lower loan rate RG. The volume of good
loans LG is constant because the whole market is always covered. As n increases, banks’ buﬀers decrease
and banks become less aggressivein the medium loan segment and raise RM. Hence, the aggregate volume
of medium loans LM decreases. The shadow price of condition (1) increases in n because banks are more
constrained in their lending to medium borrowers. The rents of good entrepreneurs (WG) increase in n,
due to the decrease in loan rates RG. The rents of medium entrepreneurs (WM) decrease in n due to
higher loan rates RM and a lower loan volume LM. Finally, banks’ proﬁts (nΠ) decrease. Aggregate
welfare (W) is non-monotonic. For this numerical example, it reaches its maximum at n∗ = 6.
in the banking sector. λ is a measure of how much a bank suﬀers from having to adhere
to condition (1). A higher λ implies a higher marginal proﬁt of the banks when condition
(1) is relaxed. The third chart of Figure 4 shows that a higher number of banks leads
to an increase in λ, reﬂecting the tighter constraints on banks’ lending in the medium
segment.
In Proposition 1b, the degree of competition is identiﬁed with the number of banks n.
However, the intensity of competition is also aﬀected by transportation costs t. When
transportation costs decrease, “shopping around” for loans becomes easier. As can be seen
from the proof of Proposition 1b in the Appendix, a decline in t has similar consequences
as an increase in n. In particular, the volume of medium loans decreases, and the shadow
price λ increases.
10Welfare. Within this setting, utilitarian welfare consists of four parts: aggregate rents of
the three types of entrepreneurs, and aggregate proﬁts of banks. Bad entrepreneurs do not
receive any loans, hence their rents are zero. Welfare for good and medium entrepreneurs
is equal to the rents of entrepreneurs who receive a loan. Interestingly, and in contrast
to the ordinary Salop model, aggregate welfare is not strictly increasing in the number of
banks n, although there are no entry costs.
Proposition 1c (Welfare) If 4pM Y > 5r, the welfare function is non-monotonic in





qM r(4pM Y − 5r)
. (7)
For large n, welfare converges to qG (Y − r), the aggregate NPV of good projects.
The reason behind this result is the banks’ lending constraints. Increasing competition
decreases banks’ ability to lend to (proﬁtable) medium entrepreneurs.13 Since the banks’
margins in the good loan segment converge to zero, banks cannot grant any medium
loans in the limit. Therefore, for n → ∞, welfare converges to the aggregate NPV of good
projects. The welfare loss of excessive competition in the banking sector can be arbitrarily
large, for example if medium projects have a large net present value, pM Y ≫ r.
Summing up, there is a welfare-optimal degree of competition. Welfare reaches a maxi-
mum when (7) holds. As before, competition can be identiﬁed just as well with the size
of transportation costs t.
Market Entry. In order to analyze the eﬀects of free entry in the banking sector, let
us assume that there are ﬁxed entry costs f. Banks will then enter until Π = f. Hence,







M Y 2 − 2f t/qM
2f r
. (8)
Here, the ﬁxed entry costs f deter banks from entering, dn/df < 0, as is always the case
in Salop models with free entry. The reason is that the higher ﬁxed costs can only be
13In the absence of medium entrepreneurs, qM would be zero, and n∗ would converge to ∞, which
means that welfare would be a strictly increasing function.
11earned in equilibrium if there is less competition and, hence, higher margins. As a result,
all other endogenous variables (lG, lM, RG, RM, and λ) respond to a change in ﬁxed costs
f. The comparative statics with respect to f are analogous to those with respect to n
(but with the opposite sign). An increase in f leaves the aggregate amount of good loans
unchanged, but it increases the market penetration in the medium loan segment. The
shadow price of condition (1) decreases in f because banks are less constrained in their
lending to medium borrowers. As a result, higher entry costs lead to larger banks for two
reasons. First, fewer banks enter, increasing the loan volume in the good market segment.
Second, banks expand their medium loans due to higher buﬀers in the good segment.
As in the traditional Salop model, there is excessive entry in this model. The reason is that
ﬁrms do not take into account the negative externality that their entry has on the other
ﬁrms’ proﬁts. In this model, there is a second externality that exacerbates the excessive
entry problem. Banks do not take into account the negative externality that their entry
has on their competitors’ risk-bearing capacities, and hence on the credit availability for
medium entrepreneurs.
4 Credit Risk Transfer
We now allow banks to transfer risks from their balance sheets to other investors. For
simplicity, we model credit risk transfer as an insurance contract with outside investors.
The possibility of trading credit risk relaxes condition (1). Hence, CRT may improve the
access to credit for medium entrepreneurs. The higher the shadow price of condition (1),
the higher the beneﬁts of banks from transferring their credit risks. We will see, however,
that the functioning of CRT markets depends crucially on the type of information un-
derlying the banks’ loans. We will distinguish between two types of information: public
information and private information.
4.1 Model Setup
Insurers. Outside of the banking system, there is a continuum of risk neutral investors
who are willing to insure the banks against credit default at a fair premium.14 We assume
14As an alternative, one could assume that there are several economies, each of which contains a Salop
circle. Then banks in diﬀerent economies can share their credit risk. For a large number of economies,
12that the market for CRT is anonymous, such that the amount of transferred credit risk
is unobservable by the insurers. This seems to be reasonable given the opaqueness and
complexity of CRT markets.
Public vs. Private Information. We assume that the information produced by a
bank in the screening process is either publicly or privately observable by the bank. If the
information is publicly observable, it can also be observed by potential insurers. If the
screening information is privately observable, it is not observable by potential insurers.
The distinction between public and private information is related to that between hard
and soft information, popularized by Stein (2002) (see also Petersen, 2004). For example,
a credit rating that is produced by a standardized statistical rating system on the basis of
balance sheet information is hard information and is publicly observable by other parties.
In contrast, the personal impression of the loan oﬃcer during the loan interview is soft
information and cannot be publicly observed.
In the following, we will discuss the properties of an equilibrium with credit risk transfer
under public and private information. In each case, we will start by analyzing the eﬀect
of CRT, holding the number of banks ﬁxed; we will then allow for free market entry.
4.2 Public Information
In this section, we assume that the banks’ screening technologies produce publicly observ-
able information about the entrepreneurs. Hence, if a bank wants to transfer its credit
risk, it can communicate the quality of the underlying loans to the insurer. As a conse-
quence, only medium loans are insured. Good loans do not entail any risk, so there is no
beneﬁt from credit insurance; bad loans are not granted in the ﬁrst place.
An insurance contract will allow the bank to turn a risky loan into a safe payment. If
a bank insures a medium loan, it pays a premium πM RM to the insurer at date t =
0, independent of whether the loan eventually fails or not.15 Risk neutral competitive
the eﬀect would be the same as with risk neutral insurers. Potentially, banks could perfectly diversify
their risk at zero cost.
15Since banks choose not to default in equilibrium, it is irrelevant whether they settle the insurance
premia in t = 0 or t = 1.
13insurers break even if πM − (1 − pM)/r = 0, hence πM = (1 − pM)/r. The bank has to
reﬁnance the premium by taking up more deposits, implying an additional repayment to
depositors at date t = 1 of πM rRM = (1 − pM)RM. At date t = 1, the insurer pays RM
to the bank if a medium loan fails; if the loan does not fail, the bank receives RM from the
debtor. Therefore, the bank receives RM (1 − (1 − pM)) = pM RM with certainty. Hence,
the bank has used insurance contracts to turn a risky loan with an expected payment of
pM RM into a safe payment of pM RM.
Due to the possibility of unloading credit risk, condition (1) no longer applies. The bank
can grant more medium loans. Hence, the introduction of credit risk transfer improves
ﬁrms’ access to ﬁnance in the case of public information. We start by considering the
eﬀects of the introduction of a CRT market, holding the number of banks constant. Two
kinds of equilibria may result. First, the market penetration for medium loans improves,
but banks still do not cover the entire circle. Second, the market for medium loans may
be covered completely, like the market for good loans. In the second case, the analysis
boils down to that of a standard Salop model with two separate loan markets. Let us
therefore concentrate on the ﬁrst case.16
The bank again maximizes its expected proﬁts,
Π = (RG − r)lG + (pM RM − r)lM, (9)
where pM RM lM is now a safe payment because medium loans are covered by credit
insurance. Condition (1) is no longer binding, implying that λ is equal to 0. Hence,
proﬁts are higher than in the absence of a CRT market. The market for good loans is again
covered completely. The market for medium loans is not covered, but the penetration is
larger than in the situation with CRT. The following proposition summarizes the eﬀects
of the introduction of a CRT market with public information. See Figure 5 for a graphical
illustration.
Proposition 2a (Credit Risk Transfer with Public Information) With public in-
formation, the introduction of credit risk transfer
• leaves the aggregate amount of good loans unaﬀected,
16The second case is discussed in the Appendix.
14• increases the aggregate amount of medium loans,
• reduces the shadow price of condition (1) to zero, λ = 0,
• increases banks’ expected proﬁts.
Competition. We can now analyze how competition aﬀects banks’ behavior in the
presence of CRT with public information. In the presence of credit risk transfer, as long
as the medium loan segment is not covered completely, banks act as monopolists on the
medium loan market. Hence the medium loan volume of a single bank does not depend
on the number of banks. As a direct consequence, the penetration in the medium segment
is proportional to n. This result stands in contrast to Proposition 1b. A higher number of
banks and the resulting increase in competition improve the access to credit for medium
entrepreneurs when there is a functioning CRT market, whereas they worsen the access
to loans in the absence of credit risk transfer (see Figure 5). Proposition 2b summarizes
these results.
Proposition 2b (Competition) In the presence of credit risk transfer with public in-
formation, higher competition (higher n)
• leaves the aggregate amount of good loans unaﬀected, dLG/dn = 0,
• increases the aggregate amount of medium loans until the market is covered com-
pletely, dLM/dn ≥ 0.
Welfare. The introduction of CRT with public information leads to a Pareto improve-
ment. We have seen already that banks’ expected proﬁts increase (see Proposition 2a).
Moreover, medium borrowers beneﬁt for two reasons. First, the borrowers who had ac-
cess to credit even in the absence of CRT beneﬁt from lower loan rates. Second, other
medium borrowers proﬁt from gaining access to credit. For n → ∞, all good and medium
entrepreneurs get loans and carry out projects, and transportation costs converge to zero.
Welfare converges to the aggregate NPV of good and medium projects.
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Colors are the same as in Figure 1: Light gray stands for bad borrowers, medium gray for medium
borrowers, and dark gray for good borrowers. The solid lines refer to a situation with public-information
CRT. In the left picture, the dashed line shows the loan volume in the medium loan segment in the
absence of CRT (for good and bad loans the volumes are unchanged by the introduction of CRT). We
see that CRT leads to a higher market penetration in the medium loan segment. Moreover, the market
penetration for medium loans now weakly increases in n; for large enough n, the market is covered
completely. In the right picture, the solid line refers to aggregate welfare in the presence of CRT, the
dashed line to aggregate welfare in the absence of CRT (as in Figure 4). The welfare function has a kink
at the point where the medium loan market is saturated.
Proposition 2c (Welfare) The introduction of credit risk transfer with public informa-
tion increases aggregate welfare. The welfare function is strictly increasing in the number
of banks n and converges to qG (Y − r) + qM (pM Y − r), the aggregate NPV of good and
medium projects.
Note that this welfare result hinges on the fact that the credit risk transfer leads to an
eﬃcient transfer of (macroeconomic) risk to insurers who are better able to bear the
risks than banks. However, it is not necessary to assume that insurers are strictly risk
neutral. If they were risk averse, they would demand a risk premium for taking the
(macroeconomic) risk. In equilibrium, this would result in higher loan rates for medium
entrepreneurs and smaller loan volumes. Nevertheless, welfare would still increase due to
the introduction of CRT markets. Insurers would earn a non-negative rent (otherwise,
they would not participate), medium entrepreneurs would beneﬁt from increased access
to loans and from reduced interest rates, and banks would beneﬁt from increased proﬁts.
Welfare gains would, however, depend negatively on the degree of insurers’ risk aversion.
If the insurers’ risk aversion is too large, there will be no CRT. The maximum premium
that banks are willing to pay will depend on the shadow price λ.
16Market Entry. Consider again a situation in which, in the long run, banks enter until
their expected proﬁts Π equal some ﬁxed entry costs f. On the basis of Propositions 2a
and 2b, we can derive the long-run eﬀects of the introduction of a CRT market with public




f t − qM (pM Y − r)2/2
. (10)
Since the introduction of CRT increases expected proﬁts in the short run (cf. Proposi-
tion 2a), it attracts more banks in the long run. This implies that there is more com-
petition for good loans. As a consequence, the loan rate RG decreases. The aggregate
volume of good loans cannot change because the market is already completely covered.
For medium loans, banks have local monopolies. As argued above, the volume of medium
loans lM of a single bank does not depend on n. Hence, the market penetration for
medium loan is proportional to n; it increases as more banks enter the market. Hence,
the eﬀects of CRT on medium loans are reinforced in the long run through market entry.
4.3 Private Information
When loans are based on private information, banks cannot credibly communicate the
quality of a loan underlying an insurance contract. Therefore, the transfer of credit
risk becomes more diﬃcult. The asymmetric information about loan qualities leads to
a moral hazard problem. Banks knowingly grant bad loans only to resell them to the
insurers.17 This is anticipated by the insurers who demand a lemons premium. Under
some circumstances, the market for credit risk transfer even breaks down completely.
In equilibrium, the insurers anticipate the underlying credit risk and set their insurance
premia accordingly. When deciding whether to grant a loan and whether to insure the risk
from that loan, banks take insurance premia, and hence the price of CRT, as given. Let β
denote the insurers’ anticipated probability that an underlying loan has medium quality.
The loan is then expected to be bad with probability 1 − β. Good loans are not risky,
hence banks never insure such loans. Therefore, the insurer expects an underlying ﬁrm of
an insurance contract to be successful with an average probability of ¯ p ≡ β pM+(1−β)pB.
17This is diﬀerent from the incentive problem analyzed by Pennacchi (1988), Gorton and Pennacchi
(1995), and Chiesa (2008), where banks have suboptimal incentives to monitor loans transferred to other
parties. Here, banks know that a loan is of low quality, but they still decide to grant it.
17The insurer anticipates a ﬁrm to default with probability 1 − ¯ p, entailing a payment to
the bank.18
As above, with an insurance contract, a bank can turn a risky yield from a loan into a
safe payment. Let us give an example. A medium loan allows the bank to claim RM from
the entrepreneur. In order to completely insure this loan, the bank must buy a volume
RM of credit protection. The premium will be RM π = RM (1−¯ p)/r. Taking into account
the loan, the insurance contract and the costs of reﬁnancing the insurance premium, the
bank will then receive a safe payment of ¯ pRM at date t = 1. Hence, a bank makes a
negative expected proﬁt from insuring a medium loan (¯ pRM < pM RM); in contrast, the
bank makes a positive expected proﬁt from insuring a bad loan. In both cases, selling risk
has the positive eﬀect that condition (1) is relaxed. The bank can thus expand and grant
more loans. As a consequence, the bank never resells the entire risk within its portfolio.
Condition (1) must bind in equilibrium. If it did not bind, the bank could increase proﬁts
by insuring fewer medium risks. Also, a bank never grants a bad loan and keeps it in its
balance sheet. All bad loans are resold in equilibrium.
As in (5), a single bank’s volume of medium loans is lM = 2pM qM (Y − RM)/t, and the
volume of bad loans is lB = 2pB qB (Y − RB)/t, accordingly. Let κ be the fraction of
medium loans that a bank insures, and 1 − κ the fraction of medium loans that remain
in the bank’s balance sheet. A bank’s total loan volume (and hence the balance sheet
total) is lG + lM + lB, and reﬁnancing costs are (lG + lM + lB)r. In the best possible
case (with probability pM), all loans are repaid; the bank gets RG lG from the good loans,
¯ p(lB RB + κlM RM) from the insured bad and medium loans (net of the payments to
insurers), and (1 − κ)lM RM from uninsured medium loans. In the worst possible case
(with probability 1 − pM), medium entrepreneurs do not repay, all other payments are
identical. Hence, condition (1) is modiﬁed to
(RG − r)lG + ¯ p(lB RB + κlM RM) − (lM + lB)r ≥ 0. (11)
Obviously, an increase in the sale of credit risk (i.e. an increase in κ) relaxes (11).
18Note that, with private information, there can be multiple equilibria, depending on whether insurers
expect a high or a low average success probability. Both types of beliefs can be justiﬁed in equilibrium.
In the following, we will focus on the Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium with larger ¯ p and lower interest rates.
A discussion of the other equilibrium can be found in the proof of Proposition 3a in the Appendix.
18Because this condition is binding, it implicitly deﬁnes κ. Banks choose loan rates in order
to maximize their expected proﬁts,
Π = [RG − r]lG + [(¯ pκ + pM (1 − κ))RM − r]lM + [¯ pRB − r]lB, (12)
subject to condition (11) and taking β (and hence ¯ p) as given. ¯ p = β pM +(1−β)pB can






Substituting the binding constraint (11) in the bank’s proﬁt function (12) and considering
the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to RM and RB yields the interesting result that
RM = RB =
¯ pY + r
2 ¯ p
. (14)
Although bad loans are riskier than medium ones, and hence have a lower NPV, the
loan rate for both types of entrepreneurs is identical. The intuition goes as follows.
In each market, the loan rate is determined by the expected payments that the last
inﬁnitesimal loan (the marginal loan) earns. However, given that the bank is constrained
and inequality (11) binds, the bank must insure the marginal loan. Consequently, the
probability of success becomes irrelevant. In equilibrium, the bank oﬀers the same loan
rates for medium and bad loans.
Proposition 3a summarizes the eﬀects of the introduction of a CRT market with private
information.
Proposition 3a (Credit Risk Transfer with Private Information) With private
information, if the market for credit risk transfer does not break down, its introduction
• leaves the aggregate amount of good loans unaﬀected,
• increases the aggregate amount of medium loans, but less than with public informa-
tion,
• increases the aggregate amount of bad loans,
• reduces the shadow price of condition (1), but not to zero, λ > 0,
19• increases banks’ expected proﬁts, but less than with public information.
The directions of all eﬀects are the same as for CRT with public information. However,
because banks also insure bad loans, they have to pay a lemons premium. As a result,
the loan rate for medium loans RM is higher than under CRT with public information,
and the volume LM is lower. Because RB = RM, the volume of bad loans is positive.
Hence, the introduction of CRT improves the access to credit for medium entrepreneurs
less than with public information. In addition, CRT improves the access to credit for
bad entrepreneurs with negative net present values. Given that the reason for CRT, and
hence ultimately the reason for the existence of negative NPV loans, is condition (1), this
result is in line with the ﬁndings of Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009b). The quality
of loans may be worse in a more regulated banking system.
Competition. Consider now an increase in the number of banks. Due to stronger
competition for good loans, RG decreases, but LG remains constant. As a consequence,
the proﬁts from the good loan segment that banks can put at risk in the other loan
segments decrease. We have argued above that banks keep only medium loans in their
balance sheets; all bad loans are insured. When buﬀers decrease, banks can keep relatively
fewer medium loans in their own balance sheets. The average quality of insured loans
improves, and the lemons premium drops. Since the lemons premium is a component of
the price of credit risk transfer, the price of CRT drops, and banks can grant more loans.
The loan rates RM and RB drop.
The opposite happens when the number of banks goes down. Then, CRT becomes more
expensive because the banks prefer to keep more medium loans on their own balance
sheets. At some point, for small enough n, the market for CRT breaks down completely.
Analogously, the market will break down for large enough transportation costs t. These
results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3b (Competition) In the presence of credit risk transfer with private in-
formation, if the market does not break down, higher competition (higher n)
• leaves the aggregate amount of good loans unaﬀected, dLG/dn = 0,
20• increases the aggregate amount of medium loans until the market is covered com-
pletely, dLM/dn ≥ 0,
• increases the aggregate amount of bad loans, dLB/dn > 0,
• increases the fraction of medium loans that is insured, dκ/dn > 0.
For some ¯ n > 0, the market for credit risk transfer breaks down for n ≤ ¯ n.
The last part of Proposition 3b oﬀers a new explanation for the evolution of CRT markets
before the crisis. In the interpretation of our model, the strong increase in the use of
CRT instruments before the ﬁnancial crisis may have been due to the intensiﬁcation
of competition in the banking sector. When competition in the banking sector was low,
banks’ balance sheets were healthy enough to absorb large amounts of risk. Consequently,
CRT was not necessary, and banks granted loans with an eﬃcient risk-return structure.
When competition increased, e.g., due to ﬁnancial deregulation such as the abolishment
of the Glass-Steagall act in 1999, or the branching deregulation initiated in the Riegle-
Neal act of 1994, capital buﬀers of banks shrank and banks needed to shed more risk.
The market for CRT became active, and banks had an incentive to grant negative-NPV
high-risk loans, just in order to resell them. Hence, ﬁnancial deregulation may have
been one reason for ﬁnancial instability. The proposition is also in line with Vickery
(2007) who shows that savings banks (operating in a less competitive environment) retain
mortgages on their own balance sheet and originate loans with low levels of risk, whereas
ﬁnance companies (operating in a more competitive environment) choose an originate-
and-distribute strategy and grant riskier loans. Note again that ﬁercer competition can
also be caused by a reduction in “transportation costs.” In fact, it seems that in the years
before the current crises, “shopping around” for loans has become much easier in retail
banking in the U.S., not least due to the advent of the internet and the resulting increase
in price transparency.19
The results of Proposition 3b are illustrated in Figure 6. There is a critical n (in the
numerical example n ≈ 14) below which the market for CRT breaks down. Only for
higher n, a market for CRT with private information can be maintained. The reason
is the following. For low levels of competition, banks earn high proﬁts on good loans,
19We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention.
21Figure 6: Credit Risk Transfer with Private Information
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Colors are the same as in Figure 1: Light gray stands for bad borrowers, medium gray for medium
borrowers, and dark gray for good borrowers. The ﬁrst chart of the ﬁgure shows aggregate loan volumes.
The solid lines again refer to a situation with CRT. The dashed lines show the loan volumes in the
medium and bad loan segments in the absence of CRT (for good loans the volume is unchanged by the
introduction of CRT). If the market for CRT does not break down, there is an increase in both medium
and bad loans due to CRT; the market penetration for medium and bad loans increases in n. The second
chart shows the fraction of transferred medium loans κ, together with the fractions of transferred good
loans (which is always zero) and bad loans (which is equal to 1 as long as the market for CRT is active).
The higher n, the fewer medium loans can banks keep in their books. Notice the discontinuity of most
curves at n ≈ 14, which is where the CRT market starts to exist. Most curves also exhibit a kink at
n ≈ 19, at which point the market for mediums loans is saturated. The third chart shows welfare.
Welfare without CRT is dashed black, welfare with public-information CRT is solid black, and welfare
with private-information CRT is gray. The gray welfare function increases as long as the medium loan
market expands. Above the kink, only the bad loan market expands, and welfare decreases.
hence they need to insure fewer medium loans; as a consequence, the price for CRT
is high, leading to a complete market breakdown because the lemons problem becomes
too severe. All variables are then equal to those in the absence of CRT (cf. Figure 4).
For higher n, the CRT market is active. As n becomes larger, the penetration of the
medium loan segment increases, until at some point (n ≈ 19 in the ﬁgure) the medium
market is covered completely. The bad loan segment keeps growing. As a consequence,
the lemons premium for CRT increases, and the growth of bad loans is (slightly) smaller.
Consequently, competition has the beneﬁcial eﬀect of increasing the market penetration
for medium loans, but it inﬂates the volume of bad loans at the same time.
22When the medium market is covered completely, a further increase in competition im-
proves only the access to credit for negative NPV ﬁrms. Given that lM = 2qM pM (Y −
RM)/t, the medium market is saturated when RM = Y −t/(2npM). Since RB = RM, the
volume of bad loans will be LB = qB pB/pM < qB at this point, hence the bad market is
not saturated. The reason is the following. For a given loan rate and a given distance to
the closest bank, expected proﬁts of medium entrepreneurs are higher than those of bad
entrepreneurs, due to the higher success probability of medium projects. Consequently,
the medium loan market is always penetrated more than the bad market. When the
medium market is saturated, ﬁercer competition cannot lead to a further increase in LM.
Consequently, the price of credit insurance increases, which makes bad loans LB grow
more slowly. This is also visible in Figure 6.
The maximum volume of bad loans is bounded not only by the size of the bad loan
segment, but also by the banks’ capacity to grant bad loans. This capacity depends on
the price of credit insurance, which in turn depends on the relative number of medium
and bad entrepreneurs, qM and qB, and the NPV of loans. Of course, if the NPV of bad
loans is only slightly negative, then banks’ capacity to grant bad loans will be large. For
n → ∞, the volume of bad loans converges towards
lim
n→∞
LB = min{qB; ¯ LB}, where ¯ LB = qM
pM Y − r
r − pB Y
(15)
is the banks’ lending capacity to bad entrepreneurs.20 Hence, the market for bad loans
will never be saturated if the banks’ lending capacity for bad loans is smaller than qB,
which happens if and only if
qM (pM Y − r) + qB (pB Y − r) < 0. (16)
This condition implies that the aggregate NPV of all available medium and bad projects is
negative; the (negative) NPV of all bad projects exceeds the (positive) NPV of all medium
projects in absolute value. In reality, (16) is likely to hold. For a potential entrepreneur,
it is relatively simple to come up with a negative-NPV investment, whereas it is much
more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a positive-NPV project. Consequently, the potential amount of bad
projects qB will be large relative to qM. Because the NPV of bad projects, pB Y − r, is
negative, (16) will hold. The bad market will never be saturated. This result will be
important for the welfare assessment of credit risk transfer under private information.
20See the Appendix for a proof of equation (15).
23Welfare. When CRT is based on private information, the eﬀects of an introduction of
CRT on welfare are less clear-cut than before. The improved access to credit for medium
borrowers raises welfare, but the extension of loans to negative NPV borrowers decreases
welfare. Still, the overall eﬀect on welfare is positive. Bad borrowers beneﬁt from gaining
access to credit. Medium borrowers beneﬁt due to lower loan rates and to an improved
access to loans. The banks ultimately bear the costs of the negative NPV projects of
bad borrowers, but they still beneﬁt from CRT due to the possibility of expanding in the
medium market. Summing up, we have the following result.21
Proposition 3c (Welfare) If the CRT market does not break down, the introduction of
credit risk transfer with private information strictly increases aggregate welfare. For large
n, welfare converges to
lim
n→∞
W = qG (Y − r) + max{0; qM (pM Y − r) + qB (pB Y − r)}. (17)
Remember that, in the absence of CRT, welfare converges to qG (Y − r) for large n.
The same is true here if condition (16) holds. Hence, this proposition implies that the
potential welfare gains from the introduction of CRT are completely oﬀset at high levels
of competition.
The proposition is illustrated by the third panel of Figure 6. As long as the CRT market
breaks down, it does not aﬀect welfare. The gray and the dashed welfare curves are
identical for n < 14. At n ≈ 14, the CRT market becomes active. Welfare jumps up, and
further competition raises welfare even more. At n ≈ 19, the medium market is saturated,
and further competition only increases the volume of bad loans. From this point onwards,
welfare decreases in competition. In the limit, the two curves (welfare without CRT and
welfare with private-information CRT) converge. Again, the same results hold true also
for decreasing t.
These welfare eﬀects are interesting because they diﬀer from the results found in the
literature. In the paper by Parlour and Plantin (2008) (PP), the introduction of CRT
may decrease welfare. The diverging results stem from diﬀerences in model structures.
In PP, CRT aﬀects banks in two ways. First, banks face unknown future investment
opportunities (modelled through a stochastic discount factor). CRT allows banks to
21As in Proposition 2c, the fact that welfare increases does not hinge upon the risk neutrality of insurers.
24exploit proﬁtable investment opportunities, which may lead to a positive welfare eﬀect.
This is comparable to the positive welfare eﬀect of our static model, where CRT helps
banks to grant additional loans that could not be ﬁnanced otherwise. Second, banks have
to monitor loans because ﬁrms face a moral hazard problem. If banks do not monitor,
ﬁrms shirk and their projects’ NPV decreases. If a bank’s stakes in a ﬁrm’s returns
are too small (for example because the bank makes use of CRT to insure part of a loan),
monitoring incentives of the bank are reduced. In order to preserve monitoring incentives,
the bank must increase its relative stake in the ﬁrm. The borrowing capacity and size of
the ﬁrm decline, which leads to a negative welfare eﬀect. Hence, banks exert a negative
externality on ﬁrms. Either of these two channels can dominate, which explains the
ambiguous welfare result in PP. In their paper, if the welfare eﬀect of CRT is negative,
banks would like to commit to not using CRT instruments.
Instead of monitoring, banks screen ﬁrms in our paper before granting loans. After
screening, they hold information on the ﬁrms’ types that insurers do not have. As in
PP, CRT distorts incentives because it induces banks to originate bad loans. However,
in PP, banks harm ﬁrms by not monitoring (if this is anticipated by other investors). In
our paper, the origination of bad loans is beneﬁcial for ﬁrms (who obtain better access to
loans and lower loan rates), irrelevant for insurers (who are always at their participation
constraint), and beneﬁcial for banks (who otherwise would not use CRT). Consequently,
although monitoring and screening are comparable activities, the welfare eﬀects of CRT
can be quite diﬀerent.
Market Entry. Let us now discuss the long-run eﬀects of CRT with private information.
Since the introduction of CRT increases expected proﬁts in the short run (see Proposi-
tion 3a), it attracts more banks in the long run. Because CRT with private information
increases expected proﬁts less then CRT with public information, fewer additional banks
will enter the market.
If competition is not too ﬁerce, long-run eﬀects of CRT reinforce short-run eﬀects, as was
the case with public information. Increasing competition through market entry further
improves the access to credit for both medium and bad borrowers. However, if competition
is so strong that the medium market is covered completely, market entry improves the
access to credit only for bad borrowers. In this case, only the detrimental eﬀects of CRT
are reinforced.
25Under CRT with private information, entry is again excessive. First, as in any Salop
model, ﬁrms do not take into account the negative externality that their entry has on the
other ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Second, bank entry exacerbates the problem that banks lend to bad
entrepreneurs to ﬁnance negative NPV projects.
5 Extensions
We will now brieﬂy consider two extensions of our model. First, we analyze a modiﬁcation
of the Salop model where the entrepreneurs’ locations can be observed by banks. Second,
we will discuss what happens when insurers can observe a bank’s retention of credit risk.
Observable Locations The Salop model assumes that banks cannot observe the en-
trepreneurs’ locations. We will now show that this assumption is not crucial for our
results. Consider the setup of Section 2, the only diﬀerence being that banks can ob-
serve the entrepreneurs’ locations x. Consequently, they can (and will) price discriminate
among entrepreneurs. We ﬁrst examine the market for good entrepreneurs. Assume that
the number of banks is so large that at least two banks compete for each entrepreneur.
There is Bertrand competition for each entrepreneur. Consequently, an entrepreneur al-
ways takes the loan from the closest bank, at a loan rate that cannot be matched by the
second closest bank. Take an entrepreneur at position x < 1
2n, with the closest bank at po-
sition 0. The second closest bank is at position 1
n, with a break-even loan rate of RG = r.
With this loan rate, the expected proﬁt of the entrepreneur would be (Y −r)−t( 1
2n −x).
Hence, the closest bank must oﬀer a rate such that








Each bank can extract exactly the diﬀerence in transportation costs from an entrepreneur.
The bank’s clientele reaches from − 1
2n to 1















26In analogy to (1), ΠG − r lM ≥ 0 must hold. In equilibrium, lM = ΠG/r. Consequently,
we immediately get an analogy to Proposition 1b: As the number of banks n increases,
proﬁts in the good loan segment decrease; hence banks have less money to put at risk in the
medium loan segment, hence the market penetration in the medium segment decreases.
This mechanism is the driving force of the main results of this paper. Therefore, the
results of the paper will also go through with observable locations. The comparative
statics with respect to the degree of competition are identical to those with unobservable
locations of entrepreneurs. Especially welfare can again be non-monotonic in the case of
private-information CRT.
Observable Retention Rates In the private information case, we have based our cal-
culations on the assumption that insurers can observe neither the type of an entrepreneur,
nor the fraction of a loan’s risk that is retained in a bank’s portfolio. As a consequence,
the retention rate was zero for bad loans, and 1 − κ for medium loans (and 1 for good
loans). With an observable retention rate, banks can commit to granting and insuring
only medium loans. In equilibrium, the retention rate has to be high enough to destroy a
bank’s incentives to grant bad loans and then insure them.
The expected proﬁt from a bad loan, insured at the premium of a medium loan, is
κpM RM + (1 − κ)pB RM − r. The proﬁt from granting and insuring bad loans has
to be negative,
κpM RM + (1 − κ)pB RM − r < 0,





Furthermore, a modiﬁed version of (1) holds. A bank’s proﬁts from good loans are unaf-
fected and are equal to ΠG = qG t/n2. Now there is a multiplier eﬀect. Banks can use the
proﬁts from good loans to grant medium loans, of which they insure a fraction κ. The
insured fraction leads to new safe cash streams, which again can be used to grant medium
loans. Since the multiplier is smaller than one, the equilibrium volume of medium loans
can fall short of a bank’s desired volume. The shadow price λ will then still be positive.
Note that observable retention rates can prevent the granting of bad loans and will there-
fore increase welfare relative to the situation considered before. However, rising competi-
tion will still be welfare-decreasing for large n because ﬁercer competition reduces banks’
27risk-bearing capacities (but less than without CRT). Therefore, welfare will be lower than
under public information, especially for high levels of competition. In the limiting case
of extreme competition (n → ∞), banks’ proﬁts in the good loan segment vanish. The
volume of medium loans converges to zero, and welfare drops to W = qG (Y − r), as in
Proposition 3c.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown how credit risk transfer can improve the access to ﬁnance for
risky borrowers by increasing banks’ risk-bearing capacities and thereby relaxing lending
constraints. Without CRT, a bank may be reluctant to grant loans to risky borrowers
because such loans threaten its solvency. An introduction of markets for CRT generally
leads to a loan expansion and thereby to an increase in welfare because it enables borrowers
to ﬁnance proﬁtable projects that would otherwise not have been carried out.
However, a bank’s ability to transfer risks depends on whether the bank grants loans on
the basis of public or private information. If loans are granted on the basis of public
information, credit risk transfer works smoothly because banks can easily convey the
quality of their borrowers to insurers and will not have an incentive to grant (and transfer)
unproﬁtable loans. If loans are granted on the basis of private information, the transfer
of credit risk is more diﬃcult because the insurers cannot observe the quality of a bank’s
borrowers. This leads to a moral hazard problem at the originating bank. It can exploit
the informational asymmetry by granting unproﬁtable loans and transferring the risk
to the insurers. The insurers anticipate this and demand a lemons premium. As a
consequence, banks do not insure their loan portfolio to the same degree as with public
information. Here the possibility of transferring risks improves the access to ﬁnance not
only for medium (i.e. risky, but proﬁtable) borrowers, but also for bad (i.e. unproﬁtable)
borrowers, which leads to an increase in aggregate risk in the economy.
Nevertheless, the overall welfare eﬀect of an introduction of CRT markets is always positive
in our setup. Even with private information, CRT is beneﬁcial because the welfare gains
from the improved access to credit for medium borrowers overcompensate the welfare
losses from the improved access to credit for bad borrowers.
28Furthermore, we have emphasized the role of banking competition. In our basic setup,
we ﬁnd that the undersupply of risky loans is most severe in a highly competitive envi-
ronment. The reason is that the banks’ margins in other types of business (the good loan
segment) and hence the potential to absorb losses from risky loans are small under such
circumstances. With CRT, increasing competition no longer leads to a deterioration in
borrowers’ access to ﬁnance; in fact, the borrowers’ access to ﬁnance improves both with
public and private information. However, increasing competition may be harmful in the
presence of CRT with private information. When the medium loan market is saturated,
a further increase in competition improves the access to ﬁnance only for bad borrowers,
and welfare decreases. In the limit, this completely oﬀsets the welfare gains from credit
risk transfer.
CRT markets break down when banking competition is very low. Low competition implies
that banks have large risk-bearing capacities and can keep most of their medium loans in
their own balance sheets. This reduces the average quality of loans to be insured, such
that insurers are no longer willing to participate. This may explain why CRT markets
appeared in an environment of intensifying banking competition, after banking markets
had been deregulated in the 1980s and 1990s and banks’ margins had been reduced by
competition from non-bank intermediaries.
The sharp distinction between banking markets with public and private information
should not be taken too literally. The pure public information case can hardly be found in
the real world and should rather be seen as a benchmark case in which CRT markets work
perfectly. In reality, loan markets are always characterized by some degree of asymmetric
information; hence, CRT markets will never work perfectly and will always involve some
moral hazard in the origination of loans. Moreover, the welfare analysis presented in this
paper abstracts from the costs arising from ﬁnancial instability. Such costs would have
to be balanced against the beneﬁts from CRT, such as the improved access to ﬁnance for
proﬁtable borrowers.
Our results on the destabilizing role of highly competitive banking markets in the presence
of credit risk transfer are well in line with the traditional literature on the harmful eﬀects
of banking competition on ﬁnancial stability. Our paper yields a number of interesting
testable implications regarding the eﬀect of competition on banking markets. First, CRT
markets are most likely to develop in an environment of intensive banking competition.
Second, in the presence of CRT with private information, a rise in competition tends
29to lower average loan quality when most proﬁtable lending opportunities have already
been exploited; then new loans tend to be low quality loans. Both predictions are in
line with the observations from the current subprime crisis. The development of CRT
markets coincided with intensifying competition in the banking market due to deregulation
and the entry of non-bank competitors. Moreover, the late years of the credit boom
preceding the crisis were characterized by both increasing competition in the banking
sector and decreasing loan quality. Further research is needed to explore in more detail




Proof of Proposition 1a. We will ﬁrst solve for the endogenous variables of our model
in an equilibrium where the good market is covered, the medium market is not covered,
and the shadow price λ is strictly positive. Then we will derive the conditions under
which this equilibrium obtains.
Banks maximize their expected proﬁts given by (6), subject to condition (1). We set up
the Lagrangian Λ and plug in the loan demand functions lG and lM from (3) and (5),
Λ = (RG − r)lG + (pM RM − r)lM + λ
￿
(RG − r)lG − r lM
￿




























Taking the ﬁrst-order conditions of the Lagrangian Λ with respect to RG, RM, and λ, and
setting R′
G = RG in a symmetric equilibrium, we obtain




RM = Y −
qG t2







n2 qM r2, (23)

















2 pM qM r Y − qG t
2￿
. (26)
We now show under which conditions this equilibrium obtains. We ﬁrst derive the con-
dition under which the good market is covered for lower n than the medium market.
Consider a situation in which the market for good loans is not covered. Then banks
enjoy local monopolies in this loan segment. The critical, indiﬀerent entrepreneur at
position xG would have (Y − RG) − txG = 0, hence xG = (Y − RG)/t and lG =
2qG (Y − RG)/t. Denote by ΠG a bank’s proﬁts in the good loan segment. Then
ΠG = (RG − r)lG = (RG − r)(Y − RG)2qG/t. The ﬁrst-order condition ∂ΠG/∂RG = 0
implies that RG = (Y +r)/2, lG = qG (Y −r)/t, and ΠG = qG (Y −r)2/(2t). Since there is
no competition among banks, these values do not depend on n. Equation (1) is equivalent
to ΠG = rlM, which implies that lM = ΠG/r if (1) binds. Hence, as long as banks do not
interact at all, LG = nlG and LM = nlM are proportional to n.
The question is now under which condition the good market is covered (LG = qG) for
lower n than the medium market. Clearly, the answer must depend on the ratio between
qG and qM. If the good market is relatively small, the banks’ risk-bearing capacity will
be small and banks can cover only part of the medium market. Then the good market
will be saturated ﬁrst. The good sector is saturated if LG = nqG (Y −r)/t = qG, hence if
n = t/(Y −r). The medium sector is saturated if LM = nqG (Y −r)2/(2tr) = qM, hence
if n = 2qM rt/[qG (Y −r)2]. Comparing these two critical values for n, one ﬁnds that the







This yields the ﬁrst condition of Proposition 1a. Note that this condition is very likely
to be satisﬁed in reality. The fraction (Y −r)/r gives the return of a project in the good
segment. This number will not exceed a few percentage points; the right hand side of
(27) will thus typically be well below 1. Hence, qM could even be well below qG under
this condition.
For n ≥ t/(Y − r), the good market is covered. This is the second condition in the
proposition. If this condition were violated, banks would not compete at all. All interest
31rates would be independent of n, and aggregate loan volumes (and welfare) would be
proportional to n. At the critical n = t/(Y − r), the medium market is not covered due
to condition (27). For larger n, LM decreases (see (25)). Hence, the medium market is
not covered.




qM r(pM Y − r).
This is the third condition in the proposition. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1b. We see that, for an individual bank, dlG/dn < 0 and
dlM/dn < 0, see (24) and (25). In the aggregate, LG = qG. The market is still covered
completely, such that dLG/dn = 0, which proves the ﬁrst statement of the proposition.
In the medium market, LM = (qG t)/(nr), see (25), which depends negatively on n. This
proves the second statement of the proposition. Finally, taking the derivative of (23) with
respect to n, we ﬁnd that dλ/dn > 0, proving the third statement of the proposition. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1c. Welfare consists of the expected proﬁts and rents of banks,
depositors, and borrowers. Depositors’ participation constraints are binding, their rents
are equal to zero. Aggregate welfare for good and medium entrepreneurs is




((Y − RG) − tx)dx = qG
￿





WM = qM 2n
Z xM
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where xM is deﬁned by (4). The banks’ proﬁts Π are given by (6). Aggregate welfare is
then
W = WG + WM + nΠ = qG
￿
(Y − r) + t




















Solving for n gives the optimal n∗ as in (7). For n → ∞, W converges to qG (Y − r). ￿
32Proof of Proposition 2a. The bank’s proﬁt function is given by (9). Banks can swap
risky loans against safe payments with the same expected return by insuring a loan, hence
condition (1) is no longer binding. This implies that λ is equal to 0, proving the third
statement of the proposition.
Loan volumes are as in (3) and (5), given that the medium loan market is not covered
completely. Plugging in loan volumes, taking the derivative of a bank’s expected proﬁts Π
with respect to RG and RM, and taking into account the symmetry of banks (R′
G = RG),
we obtain










Hence, RG is unchanged by the introduction of CRT, and the market is covered com-
pletely as before, LG = qG. Hence, dLG/dn = 0, which proves the ﬁrst statement of the
proposition.
Comparing RM before and after the introduction of CRT, we ﬁnd that RM decreases due






















hence if λ is positive in the absence of CRT, see (23). Therefore, individual and aggregate
loan volumes in the medium loan segment, lM and LM increase, see (5), which proves the
second statement of the proposition.




(pM Y − r)2
2t
. (32)
The condition λ > 0 is suﬃcient for an increase in expected proﬁts due to the introduction
of CRT. This proves the ﬁnal statement of the proposition.
The expansion of medium loans due to the introduction of CRT may lead to a complete
coverage of the medium loan segment. As before, the market for good loans is not aﬀected
by CRT. Since the medium market is covered, banks no longer enjoy local monopolies,
33but they compete ` a la Salop, as in the good loan segment. Banks maximize ΠM =
(pM RM − r)lM subject to lM = qM (1/n + (R′
M − RM)/t), in analogy to (3). Taking the
ﬁrst-order condition, setting R′








Loan volumes are lM = qM/n due to symmetry, banks’ proﬁts are ΠM = pM qM t/n2.
Let us again go through the statements of the proposition. First, the amount of good
loans is unaﬀected. Second, the amount of medium loans has increased (the market was
not covered before). Third, condition (1) is not binding, hence the shadow price λ is zero.
Finally, proﬁts increase if condition (1) was binding in the absence of CRT. Hence, all
four statements of the proposition are also true when the medium market is covered after
the introduction of CRT. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2b. As argued above, the aggregate loan volume in the good
loan segment, LG = qG, does not depend on n, as the market is already saturated. This
gives us the ﬁrst part of the proposition. Moreover, we can plug RM from (31) in (5) to
obtain lM = qM (pM Y −r)/t. We see that the medium loan volume of a single bank does
not depend on the number of banks. As a result, LM = nlM increases monotonically in n
until the medium loan market is covered completely. This proves the second part of the
proposition. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2c. Welfare now consists of the expected proﬁts and rents of
banks, depositors, borrowers, and insurers. Risk insurance is fair, hence insurers’ expected
proﬁts are zero. Depositors’ rents are also zero. Consequently, W = WG + WM + nΠ, as
before. If the market for medium loans is not covered completely, we obtain the following
results. WG is as in (28),
WM = qM 2n
Z xM
0
(pM (Y − RM) − tx)dx = nqM
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34For n = t/(pM Y − r), the medium market is covered. The welfare components are then
WM = qM
￿





















The aggregate deposit supply is perfectly elastic, hence depositors’ expected utility does
not change although the aggregate deposit volume increases due to the introduction of
CRT. For good borrowers, loan rates RG remain unchanged. CRT does not help bad
borrowers to gain access to credit. Medium borrowers, however, proﬁt from the intro-
duction of CRT in two ways. Those borrower who already had access to credit in the
absence of CRT beneﬁt from lower loan rates RM. Additionally, the volume LM expands;
some medium borrowers gain access to credit due to CRT. Finally, consider the banks’ ex-
pected proﬁts. Introducing CRT, banks’ proﬁts in the good loan segment do not change;
expected proﬁts from the medium loan segment increase. Consequently, aggregate welfare
increases.
This can also be shown formally. Comparing (30) with (33), we obtain
qG
￿














































qM r(pM Y − r)
,
which is the condition for a positive shadow price λ at the end of Proposition 1a. Anal-
ogously, a comparison of (30) and (34) shows that, in the case of saturated medium loan
markets, welfare increases through the introduction of CRT markets for any positive n.
Finally, we see immediately that both welfare functions, (33) and (34), are strictly increas-
ing in n. However, welfare increases more slowly once the medium market is covered. For
large n, the medium market is eventually saturated, and welfare in (34) converges to
qG (Y − r) + qM (pM Y − r). ￿
35Proof of Proposition 3a. We already noted that proﬁt-maximizing banks that respect
the constraint (11) set identical loan rates for medium and bad entrepreneurs, as given
by (14). For good entrepreneurs, the loan rate is RG = r + t/n, as in (21). Furthermore,
in (14), ¯ p is determined by β, and β is determined by κ in (13). Hence, the symmetric
perfect Bayesian equilibrium is deﬁned by (21) and (14), reﬂecting the proﬁt maximizing
behavior of banks, and (13), reﬂecting the rational beliefs of the insurers. Consequently,
we have three equations for three variables, RG, R = RM = RB, and ¯ p (the last of which
deﬁnes κ).
We can solve this system of equations for RG, R, and ¯ p. We ﬁnd two solutions for ¯ p,
¯ p =
n2 (pB qB + pM qM)r(pM Y + r) − pM qG t2 ±
√
A














M Y − pBr) + pM qM (p
2
M Y − pM r)].
Hence, there are also two solutions for R, whereas RG = r + t/n in both cases. There
are two equilibria with diﬀerent values for R and ¯ p, but identical RG. The existence
of multiple equilibria is intuitive. Assume that ¯ p, the success probability expected by
insurers, is relatively low. Then the insurers will demand a high premium for insuring
credit risk. Therefore, banks have high marginal costs of granting medium and bad loans,
and banks will pass on part of these costs to the entrepreneurs. R = RM = RB will be
high, and the loan volumes lM and lB will be low. However, the proﬁts from good loans
do not depend on ¯ p. Consequently, a bank can keep a larger fraction of medium loans
on its books, so that κ is relatively low, and the average quality of insured loans is also
low (implying a low ¯ p). Hence, the insurers’ initial belief is justiﬁed in equilibrium. An
analogous argument can be made for relatively large ¯ p. Hence, the existence of multiple
equilibria is intuitive, and it is conﬁrmed by the algebraic expression of (35).
However, the equilibrium with the larger ¯ p is Pareto-eﬃcient. Insurers are indiﬀerent
between the two equilibria. Entrepreneurs prefer the equilibrium with higher loan volumes
and lower loan rates, i.e. that with higher ¯ p. Banks prefer the equilibrium with lower
credit insurance premia, i.e. that with higher ¯ p. Consequently, in the following, we will
concentrate on the Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium, that with the positive sign in (35).
Some statements of Proposition 3a follow immediately. First statement: RG is unaﬀected
by CRT; the determining equation is the same as in the absence of CRT. Consequently,
36the coverage of the good loan segment does not change, LG = qG. Third statement:
The amount of bad loans is strictly positive under private-information CRT, hence it
increases due to CRT. Fifth statement: Expected proﬁts of banks increase less than
under public-information CRT because banks cannot commit to not granting loans to
bad borrowers. In equilibrium, insurers will demand higher premia for insuring loans
than with public-information CRT. Consequently, the costs of providing an additional
loan are higher. Banks ultimately bear the costs arising from the lemons problem. Second
statement: Banks’ eagerness to lend to medium entrepreneurs is determined by marginal
costs. These consist of reﬁnancing costs r and of the costs from CRT (banks always
insure the risk of the marginal medium loan). The latter costs are determined by β.
The higher the probability β that an insured loan is medium, the lower are the costs of
insurance. With public-information CRT, β = 1 because no bad loans are granted; with
private-information CRT, β < 1. As a consequence, the marginal costs are higher with
private-information CRT, the loan volume lM is smaller, and the loan rate RM is higher.
However, with a volume lM like in the absence of CRT, banks do not need CRT. Hence
with a positive volume of CRT, lM must have increased. Fourth statement: λ is the
shadow price of condition (11), which is identical to (1) for lB = 0. A marginal increase
in the capital buﬀer increases expected proﬁts by λ. This increase in expected proﬁts is
due to the bank’s ability to expand lending to medium (and bad) borrowers, and it hence
depends on RM (and RB). Since RM is larger under private-information CRT than under
public-information CRT, the shadow price λ must be larger. In comparison to the case
without CRT, however, λ must decrease. As the volume of loans lM and lB increases, the
according interest rate R falls, hence the shadow price of the binding condition (11) is
smaller than in the absence of CRT. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3b. Consider equation (11),
(RG − r)lG + ¯ pR(lB + κlM) − (lM + lB)r ≥ 0,
and let the number of banks n increase. Competition and loan rates on the market for
good loans are the same as in the absence of CRT (and as with public information).
Hence, the good loan market is completely covered as before, dLG/dn = 0, which proves
the ﬁrst statement of the proposition. An increase in n implies that (RG−r)lG decreases;
RG decreases, lG decreases, and r remains constant. Let us keep R ﬁxed for the moment.
Then, both lM and lB do not change as n increases. Hence, banks need to raise κ in
37order to fulﬁll (11). (13) reveals that β increases when a larger fraction of medium loans
is insured (with constant loan volumes). Insurers anticipate a better quality of insured
loans, and ¯ p = β pM + (1 − β)pB increases as well. This means that the marginal proﬁt
from an insured loan, ¯ pR − r, increases. Consequently, banks will expand loan volumes
lM and lB by lowering loan rates RM = RB = R. This triggers oﬀ a reinforcing multiplier
eﬀect. Due to (11), banks need to increase κ even further. The ﬁnal equilibrium has
higher aggregate loan volumes LM = nlM and LB = nlB at lower loan rates R, and a
higher share of insured medium loans κ. Of course, LM and LB can only rise until the
loan segments are covered completely.
All these comparative statics hold only if the market for CRT does not break down.
Mathematically, this happens if the term under the square root in (35), A, becomes
negative, such that no real solution obtains. The critical ¯ n below which the market for
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Below this ¯ n, all parameters are as in Section 3 (no CRT). ￿
Proof of Equation (15). When the number of banks n increases, the bad loan segment
will not necessarily be covered completely. To show this, we will derive the equilibrium
where the bad loan segment is never covered and will then derive the condition, under
which this equilibrium obtains.
If n goes to ∞, the proﬁts from good loans go to zero. Consequently, banks must insure all
loans that they grant, κ = 1. In an equilibrium where the bad market is not covered even
for large n, banks always enjoy local monopolies over bad entrepreneurs. The expected
proﬁt on bad loans is
lB (¯ pRB − r) = 2qB pB
¯ pRB − r
¯ pt
(Y − RB),
which is maximized for
RB =
¯ pY − r
2 ¯ p
,
which yields an aggregate bad loan volume of
LB = nqB pB
¯ pY − r
¯ pt
.
38The aggregate medium loan volume is LM = qM. Considering that β = κlM/(κlM + lB),
κ = 1, and lM = qM/n, we obtain
¯ p = β pM + (1 − β)pB =
¯ ppM qM t + np2
B qB (¯ pY − r)
¯ pqM t + npB qB (¯ pY − r)
.








where X = qM t+ nqB pB Y and Z = npB qB (pB Y + r) + pM qM t. For large n → ∞, we
obtain X ≈ nqB pB Y and Z ≈ npB qB (pB Y + r). n drops out of the expression for ¯ p,
hence now
¯ p =
pB qB (pB Y + r) ± [pB qB (PB Y − r)]
2pB qB Y
.
The two solutions are ¯ p = pB and ¯ p = Y/r, the ﬁrst of which is economically meaning-
less (it would imply that only bad loans are insured, but in this case, CRT would be
prohibitively expensive).
With κ = 1, we have β = lM/(lM + lB) and LB = n   lB =
n(1−β)
β lM. Considering that
¯ p = r/Y = β pM + (1 − β)pB and lM = qM/n, we obtain
LB = qM
pM Y − r
r − pB Y
. (37)
This volume can only be reached if it does not exceed qB. This will happen if condition
(16) holds; then, the market for bad loans is never covered completely, and the maximum
volume of bad loans is as calculated above. If condition (16) does not hold, all bad
entrepreneurs will get loans if competition is strong enough. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3c. Aggregate welfare consists of the expected proﬁts and util-
ities of banks, depositors, (good, medium, and bad) borrowers, and insurers. Depositors,
good borrowers, and insurers are unaﬀected by the introduction of private-information
CRT; banks and medium borrowers proﬁt. Given that CRT is now based on private
information, loans are also granted to bad borrowers with negative NPV projects. Bad
borrowers proﬁt from the improved access to credit. Summing up, the introduction of
CRT increases aggregate welfare in spite of the expansion of negative NPV loans.
Now consider the limit of n → ∞. The consequences of equation (15) for welfare are
immediate. For n → ∞, aggregate transportation costs vanish, and aggregate welfare
39equals the aggregate NPV of projects. If condition (16) holds, aggregate welfare is thus
W = LG(Y − r) + LM(pM Y − r) + LB(pB Y − r)
= qG (Y − r) + qM (pM Y − r) + qM
pM Y − r
r − pB Y
(pB Y − r)
= qG (Y − r).
The welfare gain from loans to medium entrepreneurs due to CRT is completely oﬀset by
the negative NPV of bad projects for high levels of competition.
If condition (16) does not hold, aggregate welfare is simply
W = qG (Y − r) + qM (pM Y − r) + qB (pB Y − r).
All markets are covered for large n, hence the only eﬀect of an increase in n is a reduction
of transportation costs. ￿
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